(Press Release) DES
MOINES – U.S. Senator Sam Brownback, Republican candidate for president,
outlined a "diplomatic surge" for Iraq that would aim for long-term stability by
creating a soft partition for the three major ethnic groups in Iraq, with
Baghdad serving as the seat of a united federal government.
"We should
implement a diplomatic surge that promotes a federal Iraq where Sunnis, Shi'a
and Kurds manage their own affairs within a unified state," said Brownback. "If
we do not embrace the goal of federalism in Iraq, we will find ourselves held
hostage to the endless debates between Iraqi political parties that have
occurred over the last two years. The
three-state political solution could create the equilibrium and stability that
is necessary to ensure that we do not have to return to Iraq."
Brownback spoke at a forum jointly hosted by the
U.S. Center for Citizen Diplomacy and the Greater Des Moines Committee on
Foreign Relations. He painted a stark picture of failure in Iraq:
"Some
people suggest that we withdraw our troops, but I would remind them of the
consequences of failure. Iraq would become a safe haven for al Qaeda. It would
become a failed state and risk regional war. It would descend into genocidal
chaos."
Brownback continued, "The longer Iraq goes without political
equilibrium, the bigger the risk of total breakdown. Ironically, an implosion in
Iraq would probably end up creating three states."
Brownback said that
history suggests that Iraq would be well-served by a federal system:
"The
three-state political solution reflects the historical organization of the
territory of Mesopotamia, acknowledges the demographic and cultural realities of
modern day Iraq and would preserve the integrity and sovereignty of
Iraq."
Brownback traveled to Iraq from January 9-10, 2007, and met with
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Kurdish regional President Massoud Barzani, U.S.
Generals Raymond Odierno and George Casey, Jr., and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
Zalmay Khalilzad.
In November 1999, Brownback spoke to the National
Assembly of the Iraqi National Congress, where he highlighted the need for a
comprehensive policy to deal with Saddam Hussein and post-Saddam
Iraq.
The full speech follows:
Some people suggest that we
withdraw our troops, but I would remind them of the consequences of failure.
Iraq would become a safe haven for al Qaeda. It would become a failed state and
risk a regional war. It would descend into genocidal chaos. Instability, terror
and genocide are not acceptable for Iraq or the United States.
If we
fail in Iraq now, we will probably have to return in the near future to clean up
an even bigger mess. There is simply no substitute for victory. We're in a tough
spot, but we have to get this one right.
No one wants to lose. The
American people want to succeed.
There is some good news. U.S.
casualties are down this month. That is a remarkable development, given the
amount of fighting our men and women have done since the surge has been in
place. They are doing an extraordinary job.
But better news about
casualties is only part of the story. We need more than a military solution to
succeed in Iraq. Iraq needs to stabilize for the long term.
That means we
need a diplomatic solution. The key is for the Sunnis, the Shi'a and the Kurds
to reach some type of political equilibrium. That will allow the Iraqis to drive
out the terrorists, build their country and survive in a very tough region of
the world. And, of course, a diplomatic solution is the key to reducing threats
to our forces, and bringing about stability that will allow us to bring our
forces home.
A couple weeks ago, the administration released a progress
report that showed the difference between military and political progress. In a
few cases, we made progress on the military and security front. We have made
little or no progress on the political front. Iraq has not passed laws related
to oil resources, de-Baathification, provincial elections and other key
areas.
These are, of course, issues crucial to the future of Iraq. In
that sense, it is no surprise that Iraq's leaders are so deeply divided. As we
have seen over the past year or two, those divisions will not just disappear.
Every Iraqi politician knows what is at stake, and that makes compromise hard.
Boycotts of parliament have become routine. When they make progress in one area,
they lose progress in another.
We need to recognize that the political
environment is very difficult in Iraq and focus our diplomatic efforts on
keeping everyone at the bargaining table until agreements are reached in key
areas.
If you think back to the mid-1990s, we faced a similar situation
in the former Yugoslavia. When Tito left, the military apparatus that enforced
the government's power disappeared. We saw sectarian groups that did not get
along. They fought each other and then came to the bargaining table. We brought
those groups together and kept them at the negotiating table until they signed
the Dayton accords.
Steady, intense diplomatic effort is necessary to
bring about this kind of reconciliation in Iraq. In short, we need a diplomatic
surge in Iraq. Normal diplomatic arrangements are not enough.
In Iraq,
the divisions are so deep, the stakes so high, and the time so short, that we
owe it to ourselves to send our best team of respected negotiators to Baghdad to
bring all sides to the table and resolve the major issues facing Iraq
today.
And it is important that a new diplomatic initiative focus on
tomorrow as well as today. It is easy to fall into the trap of focusing only on
the benchmarks that are so important for Iraq's immediate future. But we cannot
lose sight of what it will take to stabilize Iraq over the long
term.
Yes, Iraq needs to decide how to manage its oil and deal with
former Baathists. The hatred between Iraqi groups is too deep for those measures
to keep Iraq peaceful into the future. An enduring political solution in Iraq
requires a fundamental approach to the way a multi-ethnic and multi-religious
society manages its affairs.
To develop that kind of approach, I think we
can take a page from our own history. We started out with thirteen different
states. They disagreed about what kind of government to put in place. But they
came together by moving power from the national government to the local level.
This kind of a framework, a federal system, gave us our start as a country and
it is still working today. It can be messy and complicated. But it is stable and
durable--two things Iraq needs more than anything else.
Federalism is a
particularly good plan for Iraq. To understand why, we should look back at the
very beginning of Iraq. The collapse of the Ottoman empire created a power
vacuum in the Middle East. When World War I ended, Allied powers, especially the
British, decided to reorganize the region's political geography. In Mesopotamia,
the British combined big parts of three old Ottoman provinces to form what we
now call Iraq. Those three Ottoman provinces were based on the same three
ethno-sectarian groups we find in Iraq today: Kurds, Sunnis and Shi'a.
In other words, these groups have always dominated certain areas. Such
history strongly suggests Iraq would be well-served by a federal system. Three
states within a single country, with Baghdad a united federal capital, provides
a formula for enduring political stability in Iraq. Such a political solution
would reflect the historical organization of the territory of Mesopotamia,
acknowledge the demographic and cultural realities of modern day Iraq and
preserve the integrity and sovereignty of Iraq, as well as the nascent democracy
that continues to develop and evolve.
The door is open to a federal
political solution in Iraq. The Iraqi constitution permits the creation of
federal regions. It also recognizes the Kurdish region, which is already in
place in the Iraqi north. I visited this area in January and was impressed, as
it is basically stable and has a level of prosperity. The Kurdish regional
government handles most of its own affairs, but it is still an important part of
Iraq. We should strongly support the creation of Sunni and Shi'a regions to
complete a federal system for Iraq.
I have not heard of a perfect
political solution for Iraq, and there are some who object to federalism. I am
still convinced that federalism is the most likely and acceptable way to reach a
comprehensive and enduring political settlement among all of Iraq's key groups.
I believe this plan stands up well to the concerns that have been
raised.
First, some worry about the reactions of Iraq's neighbors. They
worry that the Kurds might be emboldened to declare independence in such a
system and force Turkey to invade. I believe, however, that a U.S. diplomatic
surge in Baghdad can show our commitment to a Kurdish region that is a key part
of Iraq. With that commitment, we can reassure our Turkish allies that we
support Iraq's territorial integrity. But more important, a stable Kurdish area
reinforces Turkey's own security, so Turkey should have an interest in making
federalism work.
There are also concerns that Iran would undermine any
Shi'a region that would be established. Iran, however, already exercises far too
much influence in Iraq. Iraq is too weak to resist Iranian actions and we
already have to deal with Iranian elements in Iraq. A federal Iraq would help
strengthen the Iraqi state and give it the ability to oppose influence from
Iran. If we are really concerned about Iranian influence, we need to strengthen
Iraq's political structures, and I believe that means working toward
federalism.
I also know of concerns that a Sunni region might become an
al Qaeda safe haven. Current trends in Anbar province, however, show that local
citizens have had their fill of al Qaeda. A strong regional government would be
able to help Sunnis resist al Qaeda and keep the area clear of the terrorist
threat.
The other major objection to federalism is that some groups want
it and others do not. The Kurds strongly support federalism because they are
making it work. Some of the Shi'a support federalism while others do not. Sunnis
generally oppose federalism because they do not see its benefits. We need a
diplomatic surge to explain federalism's benefits and prove our commitment to
its success. We need to make sure Sunnis understand that federalism is the best
way for them to keep their stake in Iraq. We need to remind the Shi'a that
federalism is the best way for them to bring peace to a country where they
already have a sizable majority.
Iraqis will not agree on federalism
without strong and sustained support from the United States. But if we roll up
our sleeves and make a Dayton-like effort, we can demonstrate that federalism
provides bigger advantages for each Iraqi group than any other plan.
If
we do not embrace the goal of federalism, we will end up being held hostage to
the kind of endless debates between Iraqi political parties that have occurred
over the last two years. And the longer Iraq goes without political equilibrium,
the bigger the risk of a total breakdown. If Iraq implodes, we may see a
genocide and a regional conflict. Ironically, an implosion would probably end up
creating three states. We should push for federalism now instead of waiting for
a genocide to create it for us.
In fact, our policies should lay the
groundwork for federalism, even as Iraqi leaders create new federal
regions.
First, we should make the best of a difficult situation and work
with, rather than against, population movements inside Iraq. Sunnis and Shi'a
are moving out of mixed areas to places where their sect has a majority. While
we cannot expect federal regions to be completely homogenous due to
inter-marriage between members of different sects, we can recognize that,
demographically, federal regions are getting more recognizable every
day.
As families in mixed neighborhoods feel threatened and seek to
relocate, we should provide protection. As people arrive in areas where their
own sect forms a majority, we should provide economic support. There are large
numbers of internally displaced people in Iraq. We should make it possible for
them to resettle permanently in areas where their sect can ensure their safety.
And we should make similar arrangements for those Iraqi refugees who wish to
return to their home country even if they cannot return to the exact
neighborhood or community they fled.
Second, we should ensure that the
Kurdish region remains stable and economically growing. As I mentioned, our
diplomatic surge will need a Turkish dimension to keep the peace along Iraq's
northern border. We should also ensure the Kurdish region receives an equitable
share of U.S. reconstruction and aid dollars, something that has not been the
case so far in Iraq. In addition, we need to support a peaceful and fair
resolution of the status of Kirkuk.
Third, we need to do more to
discourage foreign interference in Iraq. We must make it clear to Iran that we
will not allow the mullahs to make part of Iraq their own. We should make it
clear to the Iranians that we intend to counter their moves inside Iraq and then
join with the Iraqi Security Forces to keep that promise.
We need to send
similar messages to Syria and Saudi Arabia. Iraq is presently weak, but it is a
sovereign country. Instability in Iraq is not good for Syrian or Saudi Arabian
security. When they give tacit permission for terrorists to enter Iraq through
their territory, they are playing with fire. Such actions add to the conflict in
Iraq and can only adversely affect their relationships with the United
States.
All of these steps can be taken now. In fact, time is of the
essence. We have to prepare for federalism now if it is to become a reality in
time to make a difference. We have to get Iraq on the road to political
equilibrium before Iraqi politics implodes. I believe that a diplomatic surge
that promotes federalism provides a path to victory.
Some believe we
should simply withdraw our troops and close the book on Iraq, but I believe we
can make another choice. We should implement a diplomatic surge that promotes a
federal Iraq, where Sunnis, Shi'a and Kurds manage their own affairs within a
unified state. This political solution can bring equilibrium to Iraq and lead to
the stability necessary to ensure that we do not have to return to Iraq. That's
the kind of ending we all want in Iraq. And if we're honest with ourselves, it's
the only ending we can accept.
